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I. Introduction

In most legal systems, competition policy and innovation policy are developed
and applied within separate spheres. In the United States, one executive branch department-the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department-and one federal agency-the Federal Trade Commission-enforce the federal antitrust laws. Another
federal agency, the Patent and Trademark Office, grants patents and registers
trademarks. No one suggests that these agencies should adopt a common regulatory policy.
However, competition and innovation policies are inextricably intertwined.
The prominent U.S. government antitrust cases of recent years have been brought
against innovative firms in the technology industry-including Microsoft, Google,
and Apple.' Throughout the history of antitrust enforcement, firms that have
gained market power through innovation have often been targets of antitrust litigation. Defendants in the most important antitrust cases shaping monopolization
law-Standard Oil, United States Steel, and Alcoa 2-became dominant primarily
through innovation in technology and business methods.

*

2

William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University. Professor of Law, Boston
University School of Law, knhylton@bu.edu. I thank Heath workshop participants at the University of Florida for helpful comments.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Google, Inc. v. United States, 95
Fed. Cl. 661 (Fed. Cl. 2011); In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 874 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal.
2012).
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
251 U.S. 417 (1920); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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A common theory of innovation, dating to Schumpeter, is that it creates temporary monopoly power, enabling the innovator to earn a supra-competitive profit
as a rent on innovation until competitors copy the innovation and drive profits back
down to the long-run competitive equilibrium level.3 The potential for a temporary
monopoly spurs innovation. Innovation leads to monopoly. Monopoly leads to entry. Entry restores competitive pricing. To the extent that this theory explains a
great deal of innovation observed in competitive markets, it implies that the same
set of economic concerns should drive both the regulation of competition and the
regulation of innovation.
In this article, Part II describes a model of competition law enforcement that
treats competition and innovation policy as the inseparable partners they ought to
be. The enforcement authority determines an optimal punishment knowing that if it
sets the penalty too high, it will reduce firms' incentives to invest in innovation,
and if firms do not invest, new goods and new markets will not be created. The authority therefore moderates the penalty in order to maintain investment incentives.
This is distinguishable from the efficiency-based analysis associated with the Chicago School of Antitrust.4 Efficiency, in the sense of reducing supply-side costs or
enhancing demand-side value to consumers, has been accepted by antitrust courts
and enforcement agencies since the Chicago revolution as a reason for moderating
antitrust penalties. Innovation, by contrast, remains a topic that is viewed as too
speculative by the enforcement agencies to serve as a justification for moderating
penalties.*6
The implications of this framework for competition policy and innovation policy are quite different from what is commonly observed today. Optimal antitrust
enforcement of monopolization law is more lenient when dynamic competitionprimarily the innovation incentive-is taken into account. The optimal penalty is
less than the level that internalizes consumer harm, the efficient penalty under the

Antonella Laino, Innovation and Monopoly: The Position of Schumpeter 2-3 (Munich Pers.
RePEc Archive, Paper No. 35321, 2011), availableat http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35321/.
4

See INGO L.O. SCHMIDT & JAN B. RITTALER, A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 105-13 (1989) (examining the efficiency-based analysis of the Chicago

School of Antitrust).
Id.
6 Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits ofAntitrust Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 10-11 (2012) (noting that the extent to which innovation concerns
should influence antitrust enforcement policy is a long-standing issue). See also JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-22 (1962) (analyzing the utility

of antitrust enforcement in terms of monopoly and innovation); Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond
Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust FostersInnovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575 (2007) (discussing whether allowing antitrust enforcement to serve as a price control method positively influences innovation); Keith N. Hylton, Brown Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39
REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 95 (2011) (noting that innovation is treated as a basis for enhancing antitrust
enforcement in the most recent horizontal merger guidelines).
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Chicago School model. Under certain conditions, subsidization of the monopolist
is an optimal policy. As for innovation policy, one possible response to a patent
application is granting the patent and giving the patent holder a monetary prize as
well.
In some respects, this model turns modern competition policy-which emphasizes the short-run welfare of consumers-on its head. Under the model's prescriptions, enforcement authorities should give considerably more attention to innovation concerns than they do now. Much of current antitrust enforcement in the
United States and the European Union adopts policies that are inconsistent with the
recommended enforcement policies of this framework.8
Part II presents two models of antitrust enforcement. The first, which this article refers to as the static enforcement model, is the now-standard efficiency theory
of antitrust enforcement. Under the static model, antitrust enforcement should aim
to internalize consumer harm. In the second model, which incorporates innovation,
the internalization policy is observed to be too punitive and reduces overall welfare
relative to a more lenient policy. The relative leniency results because punishment
must be constrained in order to maintain innovation incentives.
Part III discusses some implications for modern antitrust policy, as exemplifled by the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. and recent enforcement policies of the United States and the European Union. 9 From the perspective
of this article's framework, modern antitrust policy is in many respects misguided.
The innovation implications of antitrust enforcement received little consideration in
Actavis, and current enforcement policies on matters such as patent infringement
litigation reflect the same failure.
II. Models of Antitrust Enforcement
This section describes two models of antitrust enforcement. The first is called
the static model, and it considers the tradeoff between consumer harm and productive efficiency. The key source for the static model is Becker's theory of law enforcement, which as a byproduct provides a formal version of the Chicago model of
antitrust enforcement.'o The Becker theory recommends a shift away from an enforcement policy that seeks to eliminate any prospect of gain to the offender-the

See Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Innovation and Optimal Punishment, with Antitrust Applications, 10 J. CoMP. LAW & EcoN. 1 (2014) (examining the efficiency difference between the optimal penalty and the efficiency penalty of the Chicago School of Antitrust efficiency-based analysis).
Not all of antitrust law is opposed to this framework. In fact, David Evans and I have argued that
the dynamic enforcement model provides a positive theory of Section 2 doctrine, which is otherwise puzzlingly lenient. David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise
of Monopoly Power and Its Implicationsfor the Objectives of Antitrust, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y
INT'L 203 (2008).
9
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
1o Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J.LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974).
7
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dominant punishment policy from the time of Bentham-toward an enforcement
policy of internalizing the social harm caused by the offender's conduct." In the
antitrust setting, this implies that consumer harm should be internalized by the monopolizing firm.

The second model is called the dynamic model, and it offers a simple method
of incorporating innovation into the enforcement theory.12 When innovation is incorporated, the internalization policy of Becker is excessively punitive. The optimal antitrust penalty in the dynamic model is unambiguously less than the internalizing penalty.
The dynamic competition view of antitrust enforcement has been in existence
for a long time. It can be dated to Schumpeter.13 Still, there has been little effort to
incorporate innovation concerns into models of antitrust enforcement. The dynamic framework described here was initially described informally by Evans and
Hylton,14 and formalized in an article by Hylton and Lin. 5
A. Static Antitrust Enforcement Model
Firms have a choice over whether to perform a monopolizing act. 16 The act
could be a decision to enter into an exclusivity contract or to tie one product to another. The monopolizing act allows the firm to increase its price, leading to a transfer (7) of consumer surplus to the firm. The price increase also leads to a reduction
in output to a level below the competitive level and an associated loss in consumer
welfare (D), which this article will also refer to as "deadweight loss." After the
monopolizing act, consumers are left with the residual surplus (W).
The firm's monopolizing act may have efficiency consequences. For example,
an exclusive dealing contract with a key input supplier could have a monopolizing
11 Id.
Evans & Hylton, supra note 9; Hylton & Lin, supra note 8.
Baker, supra note 7.
Evans & Hylton, supra note 9 (analyzing American antitrust laws and their framework and offering a new dynamic framework).
15 Hylton & Lin, supra note 8.
16 This can play out in the FRAND context. See Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Casting a FRAND
Shadow. The Importance of Legally Defining "Fairand Reasonable" and How Microsoft v.
Motorola Missed the Mark, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing the fair and
reasonable standard within the scope of monopolization through essential patents); Roger D. Blair
& Thomas Knight, Problems in Sharing the Surplus, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming
2014) (discussing the FRAND limitations on monopolization and its effect on sharing the surplus); Thomas F. Cotter, The Comparative Law and Economics ofStandard-EssentialPatentsand
FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing FRAND limitations
on monopolization with essential patents); William H. Page, Judging Monopolistic Pricing:
F/RAND andAntitrust Injury, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing pricing
in a monopolization under FRAND limits); D. Daniel Sokol & Wentong Zheng, FRAND in China,
22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing the implications of patent monopolization under FRAND in China); Christopher S. Yoo, Standard-Setting,FRAND, and Opportunism,
22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing the role of FRAND in monopolization
through essential patents).

12

3
14
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effect by excluding rival firms from access to the supplier, but it could also enhance
efficiency by reducing supply costs.' 7 The efficiency gain (E) is realized in the
form of a reduction of average cost from co to c;. The new cost curve (c;) is shown
with a dotted line because it assumes that the efficiency gain is a random event that
may or may not materialize. The efficiency gain could be greater than the
deadweight loss (E > D). If so, then the firm's monopolizing act would enhance
social welfare.

P

W

T

D
CO

E

q
Figure 1: Welfare consequences of monopolizing act that also reduces costs."
W: residual surplus left with the consumer
T: transfer of consumer surplus to the firm
D: loss in consumer welfare from an increased price
E: efficiency gain
Co: original cost curve

C: new cost curve

For a review of the efficiency consequences of vertical contracting, see Andy C. M. Chen and
Keith N. Hylton, Procompetitive Theories of Vertical Control, 50 HASTINGS L. J. 573 (1999).
18 Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and
ChangingEconomic Conditions, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 247 (2010).
17
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Based on these assumptions, the efficient enforcement policy internalizes the
social costs of the monopolizing firm's conduct.19 Under the internalization approach, the firm would choose to perform a monopolizing act when and only when
the gain to the firm exceeds the loss to consumers. Efficient conduct would not be
prohibited. The internalization rule generates a simple recommendation for the optimal monetary penalty: if enforcement is perfect and costless, the penalty should
be set equal to the sum of the transfer from consumers and the foregone consumer
surplus (T+D).
If the enforcement authority is unlikely to detect and bring an enforcement action in every instance of a monopolizing act, the optimal penalty will include a multiplier. Additionally, if enforcement is expensive, the cost should be internalized to
the firm.20 If the probability of enforcement is P, and the enforcement cost is C,
then the optimal antitrust penalty is (T+D)/P+C,which I will refer to as the static
penalty,21 because my description of the enforcement problem does not incorporate
any consideration of the innovation effects of antitrust enforcement.
This model is, for the most part, suggestive because it treats enforcement as an
exclusively public sector activity. When private enforcement actions are modeled,
a link is found between the probability of a private action and the profitability of a
lawsuit.22 If the multiplier is set at a level that induces all victims to bring suit, the
probability of an enforcement action will be 100 percent. However, once the probability of a private enforcement action reaches 100 percent, there will no longer be
a need to multiply damages. It follows that the optimal multiplier for private lawsuits efficiently balances the supply of lawsuits with the number required by the optimal deterrence goal.23

19 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968).
"Internalization results in 'first-best' deterrence-in the sense that the monopolization decision will
be made when and only when it increases social welfare. We are equating first-best deterrence
with optimal deterrence, but the two can be distinguished in some settings. For example, if enforcement agents have discretion over whether to bring an action in court or in an administrative
proceeding, an optimal enforcement regime might discourage costly types of litigation or weak
claims." Hylton & Lin, supra note 19, at 251 n.12. See also Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli,
Should Tort Damages Be Multiplied?, 21 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 388, 410 (2005) (discussing first-best
and optimal deterrence in the private enforcement setting).
2o The assumption that enforcement is a natural byproduct of an offense simplifies matters, but it is
not necessarily valid. Suppose the enforcement agency decides each case by comparing the gain
from enforcement to its cost. In that case, an optimal scheme might shift the enforcement cost to
the agency in order to generate efficient enforcement decisions.
21 KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: EcONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EvoLuTIoN 43-52
(2003); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctionsfor Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652,
653-57 (1983).
22
Hylton & Miceli, supra note 20 (discussing links between damage recovery in private lawsuits
and the level of enforcement).
23 id
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B. Dynamic Antitrust Enforcement Model
This section describes an innovation-sensitive enforcement model. Return to
Figure 1 and suppose that there are two time periods. In the first, the firm decides
whether to invest in an activity that generates the market. In the second, the firm
decides whether to perform the monopolizing act.
For example, suppose the firm designs and produces a new, superior type of
artificial tooth during the first period.24 The firm cannot get a patent on the design
and the tooth is easily replicable. Facing the risk of immediate competition from
firms that copy its design, the firm may choose to take an action that excludes rivals
for some period of time necessary to recoup investment costs. For example, the
firm might enter into exclusivity contracts with the most important downstream
sellers of dental products.25
In this dynamic story, some surplus is transferred to the firm (7) and some is
destroyed (D), but the firm's conduct also rewards consumers with the residual surplus that remains after the monopolizing conduct (W). If not for the firm's firstperiod investment, which was undertaken because of anticipation of profits generated from second-period exclusionary conduct, consumers would never have received the residual surplus.
The optimal antitrust penalty has to be designed to reconcile conflicting welfare concerns. There is the static welfare concern addressed earlier, under which
the monopolizing firm should be forced to regurgitate the transfer and pay for the
destroyed surplus in order to optimally regulate its incentive to monopolize. However, the penalty will also affect investment incentives. In order to optimally regulate investment incentives in isolation, the ideal penalty would be negative-a subsidy equal to the residual surplus. The private benefit of the firm's investment is
simply the transfer (7). The social benefit is the sum of the transfer and the residual
surplus (T+ W). In order to align private incentives with social incentives, the firm
should be awarded a bounty equal to the residual surplus (W).26
To find the optimal penalty, consider the objective function that a social planner would maximize. Although the expression for the objective function is set out
in the margins, this article tries to explain it in the text with sufficient intuition to
make the footnoted material unnecessary to follow the argument.
24

25
26

David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition andExercise of Monopoly Power and
Its Implicationsfor the Objectives ofAntitrust, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 203, 233 (2008) (proposing the example based on United States v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005)).
id.
1 assume that the monopolizing firm cannot engage in price discrimination. If the firm
implements perfect price discrimination in the monopolization stage, charging each consumer the maximum that he is willing to pay, there will be no economic basis for imposing a penalty or providing a subsidy. The perfectly discriminating monopolist will not destroy any surplus. Given this,
there will be no need to impose the static penalty in order to regulate the monopolization incentive. And since the perfectly discriminating monopolist will not externalize any surplus that it
generates from innovation to consumers, there will be no need to provide a subsidy in order to optimally regulate the investment incentive.
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From Figure 1, the gain from monopolization is the sum of the transfer and the
efficiency gain (T+E). Recall that the monopolizing act generates both a wealth
transfer from consumers and an efficiency gain at the same time. To simplify, let
M represent this total gain (M= T+E). Since the efficiency gain is a random variable, so is M. Because the firm will monopolize whenever its total gain is greater
than the expected penalty (PF), the probability that monopolization will occur is
just the probability that M > PF,and the probability that monopolization will not
occur is the probability that M< PF.2 7
The firm will invest before knowing the value of the total gain (M) that will be
realized. After all, if the efficiency gain results from a cost reduction due to a new
technology, the innovating firm will not know how great its total gain is until the
technology is in place. The firm will invest if the expected gain from monopolization, net of the penalty, is greater than the investment cost. If the investment cost is
a random variable, then there is a cutoff cost level equal to the expected return from
monopolization-above which the firm will not invest and below which the firm
will invest. The probability that the firm will invest is then the probability that the
cost of investment is below the cutoff value.28
The objective of the enforcement authority is to choose the optimal fine to
maximize the net benefit to society. The net benefit consists of several separable
components. First, there is the benefit that is internal to the business enterprise.
That benefit is simply the expected profit from investment-the difference between
the expected gain from monopolization and the cost of investment given that the
firm chooses to invest. The expected penalty is not subtracted off the expected
profit because the penalty is simply a transfer of resources within society.29
Second, the enforcement authority would consider the gain to consumers if the
firm decides to invest and monopolize, which is the residual surplus that remains
after monopolization. However, given that the firm monopolizes, and society will
bear an expected enforcement cost, the net gain to society, under this set of events,
is the residual surplus to consumers less the expected enforcement cost.3 0 Raising
the fine for monopolization reduces this gain to society as long as the residual surplus is greater than the cost of enforcing the law. If the residual surplus is less than
the expected cost of enforcement, then consumers do not gain anything when the
firm monopolizes; in other words, the gain is not worth the cost from the perspective of the consumer. This implies that the authority should be willing to increase
27

28

29
30

Assume M is governed by the probability distribution H(M). Since the expected fine is equal to
the probability of enforcement multiplied by the fine, the firm will monopolize whenever M> PF.
Since the probability that the firm will not monopolize because M < PF is given by H(PF), the
probability that the firm will monopolize is 1 - H(PF).
Let the investment cost (ko,) be governed by the probability distribution V' with corresponding
density V/. The potential offender invests when k. <k, = (1-H(PF))[E(M IM > PF) - PFJ and
-(ko).
the probability of investment is
In technical terms, V(k) {[(1-H(PF))E(M MPF)- E( ko Iko < ko)].
In technical terms, this component of the authority's objective function is 9f(k.) (l-H(PF))(WPC).
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the fine when innovation offers little in the form of residual surplus to consumers.
This would discourage monopolization, thereby preserving more of the potential
innovation surplus for society.
Third, the enforcement authority would consider the benefit to society if the
firm invests and then chooses not to monopolize after observing its total gain (M) in
relation to the expected penalty.3' This is a possible outcome because the firm invests without knowing its total gain. The firm then observes its total gain after investment and decides whether to monopolize. Thus, a firm may invest and then
choose not to monopolize because the realized gain is too low relative to the expected penalty for monopolization.
The third outcome is the ideal one for the enforcement authority because it entails society getting the innovation surplus and the allocatively efficient outcome ex
post. One way the authority could secure this result is to promise not to punish the
firm before it invests, and then surprise the firm by imposing an extremely harsh
punishment after it invests. However, such an approach would work only once.
Firms would wise up and refuse to invest in the future after one firm was snookered
in such a fashion by the enforcement agency. The authority will have to commit to
an enforcement policy.
The optimal penalty maximizes the enforcement authority's objective function, which consists of the three components just mentioned.3 2 The optimal antitrust penalty in the dynamic setting is of the form (1-9 )(Static Penalty) + 0 (Innovation Subsidy), where Static Penalty = (T+D)/P+C,Innovation Subsidy = -W/P+C,

and the subsidy weight is 0 < 0< 1.3
Put more plainly, the optimal dynamic penalty is a weighted average of the
static penalty and a subsidy based on the residual surplus. Moreover, since the subsidy weight is positive, the optimal dynamic penalty is unambiguously less than the
static (internalizing) penalty.
The subsidy weight (0), itself an increasing function of the penalty, varies with
the relative responsiveness of the firm's monopolization and investment incentives
to changes in the penalty. If a change in the penalty would have no effect on ex
ante investment, while discouraging the monopolizing act, the subsidy weight
would be close to zero and the dynamic penalty would be roughly the same as the
static penalty. This might be observed if the firm's discount rate is so high that a
change in the penalty has little effect on ex ante investment incentives. If the

32
32
3

P(k.) H(PF)S.

Putting all of the components described so far together, the authority's objective function is
NB = {[(1-H(PF))E(M|M>PF) - E( ko Iko < ko )] + (1-H(PF))(W-PC)+ H(PF)S}.
Hylton & Lin, supra note 8. If F represents a fine, then a more precise description of the optimal
penalty is as follows: F.
T+D
-

P

P

where 0 is a discontinuous function of F with the properties
0 for F* > 0.

0> 0; 0

1 for F*s 0, and 9 F) >
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change in the penalty has a big impact on ex ante investment, the subsidy weight
will be close to 1, and the optimal penalty is likely to be negative-specifically, a
subsidy based on the residual consumer surplus.
The sign and size of the optimal antitrust penalty depends on several factors.
If the expected enforcement cost is greater than the residual surplus (PC > W), then
the optimal penalty is always positive. This is the case in which the administrative
cost of enforcement is larger than the residual surplus from innovation-the residual value to consumers is too small to justify the administrative costs of the assessment process. The penalty in this case is never as large as the static penalty. Its
size is determined by that of the subsidy weight, which itself is determined by the
relative elasticities of investment and monopolization with respect to the penalty.
As the elasticity of monopolization increases relative to the elasticity of innovation,
the optimal penalty approaches the static penalty.
If the expected enforcement cost is less than the residual surplus (PC < W), the
optimal dynamic penalty could be a penalty or a subsidy depending on the elasticities that determine the subsidy weight. If the elasticity of innovation is greater at
every penalty level than the elasticity of monopolization, the optimal subsidy
weight will be equal to 1, and the optimal penalty will be negative. If the elasticity
of innovation is not greater than the elasticity of monopolization, the optimal penalty will be positive.
As a result, the regulatory program suggested by this analysis looks roughly as
follows. If the expected enforcement cost exceeds the residual surplus, the penalty
is positive, but not as high as the static penalty. There is no need to subsidize in
this case because there is no benefit externalized by the innovation. The entire benefit from innovation is enjoyed by the firm. Still, since there is a benefit from innovation, the optimal policy is lenient relative to the static enforcement policy.
If the expected enforcement cost is less than the residual surplus, then there is
an external benefit resulting from innovation, even after monopolization occurs.
The decision to penalize or to subsidize depends on the comparative sensitivities of
investment and monopolization to changes in the penalty. If investment is more
sensitive to the penalty than monopolization is, then a subsidy is the solution. If
monopolization is more sensitive than investment, penalization is optimal. The reason is intuitive. The authorities want to enhance society's wealth as much as possible at the lowest cost in terms of diminished investment.34 If investment is very
sensitive, then the authority will have to subsidize. If monopolization is most sensitive, then the authority can maintain investment while discouraging monopolization.
Although the pure innovation subsidy (- WIP + C) is a potentially optimal policy given the right set of parameter values (1. residual surplus greater than expected
enforcement cost, and 2. elasticity of investment greater than elasticity of monopo34

Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Originaland Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency InterpretationChallenged,34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 65 (1982).
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lization), the penalty that internalizes consumer harm ((T+D)/P) is never an optimal
policy in the dynamic setting. The dynamic enforcement model puts a greater emphasis on internalizing the residual surplus from innovation than on internalizing
the consumer harm.
The asymmetric treatment of the innovation benefit and the consumer harm is
a reflection of the relative importance of innovation to social welfare. Innovation is
necessary in order for any consumer benefit to be realized. The model thus implies
that the optimal penalty should be constrained in order to maintain the innovation
incentive.
III. Patent Policy
This article has emphasized the antitrust application of this model, but it applies equally well to intellectual property. The model suggests a process that the
enforcement authority should implement for the issuance of patents.
Instead of assuming that the firm takes some exclusionary act after investment,
assume now that the firm approaches the enforcement authority to ask for a patent.
In this story, the firm invests and then approaches the enforcement authority. The
enforcement authority charges a fee, or perhaps awards a subsidy (negative fee).
The probability of enforcement can remain in the model, on the assumption that
there is a chance (1 -P) that the authority will simply grant the patent without charging a fee.
If the residual surplus to consumers is less than the expected administrative
cost, the enforcement authority will charge a positive fee for the patent. The fee is
designed to reduce the likelihood that the firm will choose to pursue the patent. In
other words, the scenario envisioned under this sequence of events is as follows: (1)
the firm invests in innovation, (2) the firm approaches the authority to seek a patent, disclosing its innovation (if necessary for replication), (3) the authority states a
fee for the patent, and (4) after comparing the fee to the return from the patent, the
firm decides whether to pursue the patent.
If the residual surplus exceeds the expected administrative cost, the authority
may give a monetary award or impose a fee, depending on the comparative elasticities of investment and monopolization with respect to the penalty. In this scenario:
(1) the firm invests in innovation, (2) the firm seeks a patent and discloses, (3) the
authority offers a monetary award with the patent (an award that internalizes the residual surplus of consumers); and (4) the firm accepts the patent and the award.
A. Observations and Implications
This is a good point at which to compare the implications of the static and dynamic enforcement models. In antitrust enforcement, the dynamic model is obviously lenient relative to the static model. The static policy requires the imposition
of a penalty that internalizes consumer harm. The dynamic model imposes a penalty that falls short of internalizing consumer harm because it is a weighted average
of the penalty that internalizes consumer harm and an innovation subsidy. Moreo-
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ver, under some conditions, the dynamic model provides an award or subsidy to the
monopolizing firm rather than a penalty. The possibility of subsidizing a monopolizing firm is a regulatory option that has not been considered by any antitrust enforcement authority.
In innovation policy, the standard approaches have considered patents and
prizes as alternatives. In this model, one regulatory option is to award a patent and
a prize to the firm. Again, this is a regulatory option that does not appear to have
been adopted in any intellectual property regime.
Where are subsidies or prizes most likely to be efficient? This model implies
that there are two areas of inquiry in determining the efficiency of a prize to the
monopolizing firm. The first is whether the residual surplus to consumers-that is,
the consumer surplus that remains after the firm has monopolized-is greater than
the average administrative cost of enforcing the law. If the residual surplus is less
than the average administrative cost, then the authority should impose a penalty,
never a prize. The simple reason is that monopolization offers relatively little to
consumers, even though it enhances the profits of the firm, so the authority should
discourage it more aggressively than in the case where the innovation benefits consumers even after administrative costs are taken into account.
If the residual surplus is high, the second line inquiry is an examination of the
relative sensitivities of investment and monopolization to the size of the penalty. If
raising the penalty significantly harms investment incentives while having a comparatively mild effect on the monopolization incentive, then a subsidy may be efficient. The reason is that it is better to have the innovation, even if it comes with a
monopoly, than to not have it at all. Conversely, if the monopolization elasticity is
much greater than the investment elasticity, then a penalty is likely to be optimal
because the penalty will not greatly dampen investment incentives but will dampen
the likelihood of monopolization.
Putting these observations together suggests that subsidization is likely to be
the optimal response when the firm's innovation is especially valuable to the consumer. For potentially life-saving products, consumers are likely to be willing to
pay considerably more than the monopoly price for the product, which means that
the residual surplus after monopolization is likely to be high. The other consideration is the sensitivity of investment to the penalty, which is equivalent to considering the sensitivity of investment to the firm's profits. Research and development
expenditure appears to be sensitive to cash flow in the pharmaceutical industry.35
These observations suggest the pharmaceutical industry as a candidate for the subsidization policy.
The current direction of antitrust and innovation policy appears to be directly
opposed to the sort of protection of innovation incentives suggested in this frame35

Sean Nicholson, Financing Research and Development, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE
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work. Much antitrust litigation is directed toward the technology, healthcare, medical drug, and medical device industries. Patent exploitation methods are increasingly challenged on antitrust grounds.36 Based on news accounts, actors in the
medical and high technology sectors seem to face an ever-increasing risk of antitrust litigation, from consumers and from the government. Much modern scholarship questions the value of protecting innovation profits relative to the value of increasing access to drugs and technological innovations.3 7 The increasing burden of
antitrust litigation and regulatory expropriation probably has worked to dampen incentives to innovate.
One example is the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., a pharmaceutical patent infringement case. 38 The Court held that the rule-of-reason test
applies to reverse payment settlements, overturning the scope-of-patent test adopted
by most courts.3 9 Under the scope-of-patent test, an agreement to settle a patent infringement dispute would be upheld if the terms of the agreement were within the
scope of the challenged patent. 4 0 For example, if a patent holder and an alleged infringer settled a dispute by forming an agreement in which the alleged infringer
would not attempt to enter the market until several years after the expiration of the
patent, such an agreement would violate the scope-of-patent test. However, if the
settlement granted no more protection from competition to the patent holder than
was already promised by the patent, then the agreement would not violate the antitrust laws.
It is not immediately clear that the rule-of-reason test will ultimately result in a
substantially greater risk of antitrust liability to patent holders than the scope-ofpatent test. A carefully executed rule-of-reason evaluation of a patent settlement
involves an analysis of several complicated issues, and it is unclear how they will
be resolved at this stage.41 Still, courts may over time develop rules that make it
difficult for parties to bring successful antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements of patent infringement disputes. The rules may make success under the
rule-of-reason test just as difficult as under the scope-of-patent rule. In that case,
potential complainants will be reluctant to file antitrust challenges. In the short run,
the switch from the scope-of-patent test to the rule-of-reason test kicks up a thick
cloud of uncertainty. Patent holders will be unable to predict the rule that courts
might apply, especially given the difficulty of the analysis. This uncertainty will
generate litigation and multiply the uncertainty surrounding the costs of patent infringement litigation. Since patent infringement litigation is one of the costs of
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holding a patent, the switch to the rule-of-reason test effectively reduces the value
of patents, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, where many of the reverse
payment settlements occur.
The court's analysis of the issues in Actavis reflects the view that every dollar
of consumer surplus transferred to the patent holder as a result of the patent right
reduces consumer surplus by the same amount. This view misses the fact that up to
the level of protection necessary to bring the innovation to market, there is no such
dollar-for-dollar tradeoff. The patent is what brings the product's market into existence. In the absence of the patent, there is no market in the product, and no consumer surplus. This is the reason why the need to maintain incentives to innovate
sets a limit on the extent to which consumer harm can be internalized under the dynamic enforcement model.
The fallacy reflected in the reasoning of the Actavis majority is the notion that
because rents from innovation and the surplus to consumers both come from the
same fixed lump of potential consumer surplus (W+T+D in Figure 1), enhancing
protection of the rents from innovation necessarily implies a reduction in value to
consumers. In actuality, there is no lump of surplus to distribute to consumers if
firms do not innovate. The protection of incentives to innovate should therefore be
given a higher priority than the enhancement of the share of the innovation surplus
going to consumers. A legal rule, such as that announced in Actavis, that attempts
to enhance the share of innovation surplus going to consumers at the expense of reducing innovation incentives is likely to reduce both consumer surplus and innovation incentives in the long run.
On a more general level, Actavis calls for an accommodation of patent and antitrust policies in areas in which the scope of either area of law may be contested.
In this article's framework, the same economic issues are at stake, whether one refers to an issue as one of patent policy or one of antitrust policy. Within a framework that addresses those issues squarely, a consistent set of policies emerges. Under such a set of policies, there would be no point in treating antitrust and patent
policies as if they are in conflict with one another.
There are other recent examples in which courts and enforcement authorities,
like the Supreme Court in Actavis, have treated the tradeoff between innovation
rents and consumer surplus as having a zero sum. The Federal Trade Commission
and the European Commission have both expressed the view that antitrust law constrains the enforcement of patents, especially standard-essential patents, through injunctions. 42 Standard-essential patents are often accompanied by a commitment to
license on "fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms" (FRAND). It appears to
42
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be the policy of both the Federal Trade Commission and the European Commission
that any effort to enforce a standard-essential patent through the use of an injunction may be an antitrust violation, especially if the patent is encumbered by a
FRAND commitment.43
The insertion of antitrust law into the patent enforcement process is a questionable expansion of the writ of antitrust enforcement agencies." The decision to
enforce a patent through seeking an injunction has historically been a matter of patent law. If the patent is judged invalid, the holder loses his infringement suit. The
FRAND commitment layers a contractual obligation on top of this procedure. A
firm that is sued for infringement has the option of bringing a breach of contract
claim against the patent holder when he has violated the FRAND commitment. Inserting antitrust law into this process adds a layer of additional legal complexity,
untethered to the policies of patent law and contract law. To the extent that antitrust laws provide anything novel here, it is as a source of rules that might support a
decision that is inconsistent with either patent law or contract law-either taking
property granted under the patent law or finding contractual obligations where contract law would not. This observation alone does not imply that the application of
antitrust law in this setting is socially undesirable. However, it does suggest that
the application carries a cost, in terms of uncertainty, that could distort innovation
incentives unless cabined or constrained within relatively clear lines.
The United States enforcement authorities and the European Commission
adopt the view that a FRAND commitment is equivalent to a waiver of the right to
seek an injunction.45 This is an example of a phantom contractual obligation, created by antitrust law, that is not an implication of either contract law or patent law.
Sure, a commitment to license on FRAND terms is a contractual commitment to
negotiate on such terms before seeking an injunction, but if the potential licensee
demands terms that are more favorable to itself than the FRAND commitment implies (e.g., a license fee of zero), then the threat to seek an injunction should be
viewed as one of the weapons in the arsenal of the patent holder.
The Federal Trade Commission may now view it as routine to require holders
of standard-essential patents to agree not to enforce the patents through an injunction when they seek agency approval of a proposed merger.46 The firms that have
agreed to such terms have done so in order to complete a proposed merger, so they
presumably have concluded that the merger is more valuable than the right to enforce their patents through injunction threats. The question, though, is whether the
See, e.g., Lipman, supra note 43.
See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Whither Symmetry? Antitrust Analysis ofIntellectual PropertyRights at the FTC and DOJ, 9 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 41 (2013).
45 See Sharis Pozen, Antitrust Agencies Will Remain Focused On Patent Conduct (Feb. 4, 2013),
available at http://www.1aw360.com/articles/411620/antitrust-agencies-will-remain-focused-onpatent-conduct.
46 See Donald Martin, SEP Antitrust Analysis - More Complex Than It Seems (Dec. 19, 2012),
available at http://www.law360.com/articles/401810/sep-antitrust-analysis-more-complex-than-it43
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Federal Trade Commission's policy of disarmament is socially desirable. To the
extent that it reduces the value of patents, and in turn, the reward from innovation,
it is unlikely to be socially desirable. Additionally, there is the question of whether
the Federal Trade Commission should be permitted, as a matter of policy and of
constitutional law, to condition the right to merge on the forfeiture of a property
right.
Antitrust law, in the view of the enforcement agencies, focuses primarily on
the enhancement of short-run consumer surplus.47 The dynamic effect, also known
as innovation tradeoff, is not part of the agencies' analysis. The intervention of antitrust policy would be acceptable if it took into consideration the same concerns as
the patent law. Its failure to do so may harm consumers in the long run. At the
least, some effort should be made in the enforcement process to balance innovation
effects with consumer welfare effects.
This article has only scratched the surface of the many ways in which antitrust
under the static enforcement framework conflicts with innovation incentives. The
areas of conflict are so numerous that a suitably funded enforcement agency could
supplant the work of the patent courts. For example, suppose a firm lawfully acquires a patent. What prevents the Federal Trade Commission from suing the firm
on the ground that its patent was based on something the agency views as a trivial
technological innovation and the primary effect of the patent is to extract welfare
from consumers in violation of the antitrust laws? There may not yet have been
such a bold assertion by an enforcement agency, but it seems to be the logical endpoint of current enforcement policy. 48
IV. Conclusion
Competition and innovation policies are equally implicated in many cases, especially under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Chicago School analysis, largely
of the 1970s and 1980s, advanced antitrust policy by making efficiency an important matter of concern in antitrust enforcement. The antitrust revolution that
remains to occur is a movement toward a policy that takes innovation incentives seriously. The enforcement agencies appear to be moving in the opposite direction,
displacing innovation policies of the intellectual property laws with antitrust policies aimed at increasing the share of innovation surplus going to consumers. Although the model presented here has been applied in a short and preliminary manner, it suggests that this policy is shortsighted.
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Benjamin Franklin famously said that those "who can give up essential liberty
to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety."49 Similarly,
an antitrust policy of sacrificing innovation incentives to redistribute innovation
surplus is likely to be an impoverishing policy for consumers in the long run.

49

6 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor (1755), reprinted in THE
PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 238, 242 (1963).
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